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Riding the Fence on Collective Scienter: Allowing
Plaintiffs to Clear the PSLRA Pleading Hurdle
"Law school taught me one thing;
how to take two situations that are exactly the same
and show how they are different."'
When federal circuits split on a point of law, two situations that
are exactly the same may, in fact, be different. A split in the courts
results in uncertainty in the law and encourages forum shopping. 2
This is the current situation for plaintiffs who plead securities fraud
in the federal courts. A securities fraud class action claim against a
publicly held corporation in the United States has historically
resulted in an expensive proposition for corporations and
shareholders, especially before 1995.3 At that time, plaintiffs could
file a claim and hope to unearth ammunition through discovery.4
Consequently, meritless claims were a serious problem.s
In 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (PSLRA) in order to stem the tide of frivolous
litigation.6 One principal change that the PSLRA made to
securities law was to heighten the pleading standards that a
plaintiff must meet-stricter requirements meant that surviving a
defendant's motion for dismissal was more difficult.7 To validly
plead securities fraud, plaintiffs are required to plead, among other
things, both a misstatement and scienter, or fraudulent intent, by
the defendant.8 Plaintiffs may allege liability for securities fraud
against individual defendants, such as corporate officers, or the
corporation itself.9
The PSLRA changed securities law so that the misstatement
and intent elements of a claim are pled with particularity, rather

Copyright 2010, by HEATHER F. CROW.
1. Hart Pomerantz Quotes, FAMOUS QUOTES & AUTHORS, http://www.
famousquotesandauthors.com/authors/hart-pomerantz quotes.html (last visited
Nov. 6, 2009). Hart Pomerantz is a lawyer and Canadian television comedian.
2. Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 913, 947-48.
3. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31-32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprintedin 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730-31.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Adam Pritchard, Should Congress Repeal Securities Class Action
Reform?, POL'Y ANALYSIS (Cato Inst., Wash., D.C.), Feb. 27, 2003, at 6-8,
availableat http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa471.pdf.
8. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005).
9. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (2006).
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than simply inferred. 10 In other words, before discovery ever
begins, a plaintiff must have sufficient factual detail to adequately
allege fraud." As plaintiffs strive to meet the heightened pleading
requirements, varying pleading theories and doctrines have
developed.12 One of the most controversial is the theory of
collective scienter.13
Collective scienter permits the aggregation of one person's
misstatement with the intent of another in a single pleading in
order to attribute an allegation of scienter to the corporation, rather
than pinpoint a single actor who intentionally misspoke. 4 The
issue of whether to accept collective scienter as a pleading theory
resulted in a split among federal circuits.15 Consequently, the same
set of facts may result in a different outcome in different circuits.
Consider three scenarios.
Scenario #1:
A publicly traded pharmaceutical company discovers a
revolutionary new drug. During the company's quarterly
conference call report, the CEO makes a statement about the
drug's positive results in clinical trials. Predictably, the company's
stock price receives an upward jolt. Unbeknownst to the CEO,
company scientists discover that the drug has a terrible side effect
that could render it unusable. However, the scientists operate in a
small lab in a foreign country and decide not to tell anyone.
Under a pure collective scienter theory, pleading fraud here is
viable by aggregating the unknowing false statement of the CEO
with the knowledge and intent of the scientists.16 While this may
be the only option for a plaintiff to meet the pleading requirements,
this scenario illustrates the primary argument for rejection of the
theory of collective scienter. The liability claim is too broad,
impeaching those who made statements in good faith and
extending beyond what Congress intended with the passage of the
PSLRA.

10. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2006).
11. Id.
12. Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazabal, The Locus of Corporate
Scienter, 2006 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 81, 86.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See infra Part III.
16. Kevin M. O'Riordan, ClearSupport or Causefor Suspicion? A Critique of
Collective Scienter in Securities Litigation,91 MINN. L. REv. 1596, 1597 (2007).
17. Id. at 1621.
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Scenario #2:
The CEO makes the same statements. Although the
information about the drug's side effect is not public, the CFO is
informed of these effects through lower level employees. He asks
them to sit on the information. Later, the information is leaked to
the press, and the company's stock price plummets. Again, there is
a potential claim of corporate fraud for the non-knowing
misleading statements made by the CEO while the CFO
intentionally withheld the information. Under a strict reading of the
PSLRA by federal circuit courts that reject the pleading theory of
collective scienter, the case faces dismissal because the person who
actually made the misleading statement, the CEO, had no
knowledge that the information was false and had no intent to lie.' s
On the other hand, a circuit court that has not rejected the theory
may allow aggregation of the misstatement of the CEO with the
intent of the CFO to allege corporate scienter, 9 which20 allows the
claim to survive under the theory of collective scienter.
Scenario #3:
The CEO knows that the drug is dangerous and a public
revelation of this information will cause the stock price to
plummet. He makes no public statements. The public relations
department issues statements that are eventually revealed to be
false. Although the CEO took no part in making these statements,
he deliberately failed to prevent them. Under a pure rejection of
collective scienter, the CEO's actions may enable the company to
skate on a dismissal because there is no intersection between the
individual, the misstatement itself, and the intent to defraud.2 1
Under this rule, only when all three elements collide in one actor is
a corporate liability claim adequately pled.22
This is the scenario that proponents of the collective scienter
theory warn against. A company may use its separate parts to avoid
liability by ensuring that the person with the knowledge and intent
is not the one who makes misleadingstatements.23 After Congress
18. Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353 (5th Cir.
2004); see also Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 374 F.3d 1015 (11th Cir. 2004).
19. Corporate scienter is concerned with attributing the intent element to the
corporation, rather than an individual actor.
20. City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651 (6th
Cir. 2004).
21. Southland Sec., 365 F.3d at 366.
22. Id.
23. Charles W. Murdock, Sarbanes-Oxley, Corporate Corruption, and the
Complicity of Courts and Legislatures 43-46 (Sept. 7, 2006) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract- 1012970.
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passed the PSLRA, the controversial pleading theory became
24
especially troublesome. Under the PSLRA's stricter pleading
requirements, the use of the theory of collective scienter may offer
the only avenue that plaintiffs in certain situations can take to
avoid immediate dismissal. For that reason, this Comment
recommends that courts accept the use of collective scienter as a
pleading theory in securities fraud claims, but only in very narrow
circumstances. These narrow circumstances would require
plaintiffs to allege clear knowledge on the part of a corporate
officer or director, even if that individual was not the speaker of
the fraudulent information, as opposed to simply aggregating nonknowing statements by one person with the intent or knowledge of
another employee.
Part I of this Comment explains the background of the relevant
underlying securities legislation governing corporate disclosure
and fraud, and the later-enacted PSLRA, which sets forth the
heightened pleading requirements for securities fraud plaintiffs.
Part II discusses the policy and jurisprudential theory surrounding
corporate actions and collective scienter, as well as the specific
intent requirement of a fraud claim. Part III outlines the split
among the federal circuits and examines the factual situation
present in each decision. Part IV analyzes the varying degrees of
acceptance of the theory of collective scienter by the courts,
recommending a solution that entails a narrow application based
on the facts of the situation that show knowledge on the part of a
corporate officer or director.
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND THE PRIVATE
LITIGATION SECURITIES REFORM ACT OF 1995

I. THE SECURITIES

In the wake of the 2007-2008 financial market meltdown,
litigation concerning securities fraud, in particular fraudulent
corporate misstatement claims, mushroomed.2 5 When these

24. A collective scienter theory was attempted in other earlier cases that did
not involve the pleading requirements of the PSLRA. See Nordstrom, Inc. v.
Chubb & Son, Inc., 54 F.3d 1424 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Caterpillar, Inc. v.
Great Am. Ins. Co., 62 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1995). Collective scienter was
considered by these courts as a theory of liability rather than a pleading theory, but
faced resistance nonetheless. These cases contributed to further uncertainty among
district and circuit courts as collective scienter emerged as a pleading theory.
25. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2008 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY
(2009), available at http://lOb5.pwc.com/PDF/NY-09-0894%20SECURITIES
%20LIT%20STUDY%20FINAL.PDF.
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lawsuits are meritless, a host of problems result.26 Foremost,
discovery in a securities fraud claim-regardless of the merits-is
extremely expensive; and it costs corporations, shareholders, and
the American economy millions of dollars each year.2 7 Frivolous
claims clog the judicial system and have a chilling effect on free
and open disclosure by publicly traded companies, which securities
laws were originally meant to encourage. 8
An obvious tension exists between the need to protect
corporate America from wasteful claims and the need to protect
shareholders from fraud by corporate actors. Before exploring
pleading theories of securities fraud claims, it is essential to
understand the relevant underlying legislation and regulations
governing publicly traded corporations and the changes that the
PSLRA made to these laws.
A. The Securities ExchangeAct of 1934
Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "'34
Act") in the aftermath of the Great Depression to regulate
secondary trading in the financial markets. 29 It governs a number
of activities, including transactions by officers and directors,
reporting and information dissemination, and promotion of a fair
and open market system. 30 The '34 Act was designed to advocate
an attitude of full disclosure by publicly traded corporations, rather
than a philosophy of caveat emptor for securities buyers. 3 1
1. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5-The ProhibitionofFraud
Section 10(b) of the '34 Act is the root of the fraud prohibition
rules in securities law.3 2 It not only prohibits the use of fraudulent
means through "interstate commerce or . . . the mails," but

authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to
promulgate rules governing fraudulent activities, which include the
26. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31-32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprintedin 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730-31.
27. Id. The report stated that "discovery costs account for roughly 80% of
total litigation costs in securities fraud cases." Id at 37.
28. Id. at 31-32. The report further noted that "discovery in securities class
actions often resembles a fishing expedition." Id. at 37.
29. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78nn (2006)).
30. How the SEC Protects Investors, MaintainsMarket Integrity, U.S. SEC.
& EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#secexactl934
(last visited Nov. 10, 2009).
31. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
32. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
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use of manipulative and deceptive devices. 3 3 As a result, the SEC
is empowered with broad authority over all aspects of the securities
industry, including disciplinary rights. 34
Under the authority granted by Congress, the SEC set forth
rules governing trading activities, including Rule lOb-5, which
forbids the use of manipulative devices or other means of fraud.
According to Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5, purchasers or sellers
of securities have a private (civil) right of action in addition to an
disciplinary action the SEC may take against market participants.
2. Necessary Components of a Securities FraudClaim
Although the statute and SEC rules set forth broad guidelines
for what constitutes fraud, jurisprudence requires six specific
components that a plaintiff must allege in a securities fraud
pleading in order to defeat a motion to dismiss. These elements
include a material misrepresentation or omission; scienter, i.e., a
wrongful state of mind or intent; a connection with the purchase or
sale of a security; reliance b the plaintiff on that information;
economic loss; and causation.
This Comment will focus on the relationship between the first
requirement of misstatement and the second requirement of
scienter and how these elements interact under the pleading
requirements of the PSLRA. Without one, the other is insufficient;
33. Id. § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j.

34. How the SEC ProtectsInvestors, MaintainsMarket Integrity, supra note 30.
35. SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010) ("It shall be unlawful
for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.").
36. This private right of action was implicit in a series of federal court
decisions. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982). The private
right of action was later strengthened through the congressional passage of the
PSLRA. See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196-97 (1976)
(summarizing this body of jurisprudential development).
37. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005). It
should be noted that "omissions" as used in this context is not omission as
negligence, but rather purposeful omission of material facts. In Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), the Supreme Court discusses the key factors in
silence versus a statement made with deliberate omission of material facts.
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but how the two elements are pled determines whether a claim is
sufficient to clear the PSLRA pleading hurdle.
B. The PrivateSecurities LitigationReform Act of 1995
1. Purposeand Backgroundof the PSLRA
Congress passed the PSLRA in response to a perceived abuse
of the legal system with regard to publicly traded securities.3 8 In
the House Conference Report that accompanied the passage of the
PSLRA, the Joint Statement of the Managers of the Committee
who submitted the bill, explained the necessity of such reform. 3
The statement detailed evidence of abuses of the private securities
litigation system and explained that the financial markets needed to
have confidence restored in them from an investor standpoint.4 0
Moreover, this legislation was a means to stem the exorbitant costs
to corporations and shareholders.41
The report explained that under then-current pleading
requirements, abusive or frivolous lawsuits were frequently filed
without specific allegations; later, during the discovery process,
plaintiffs hoped to expose some plausible cause of action,
preferably against a "deep pocketed defendant."4 2 The report
indicated that in addition to the monetary cost of meritless
lawsuits, the financial community suffered because many wellqualified businesspeople refused to serve on boards of directors as
a result of the fear of groundless and extortionate securities
lawsuits.4 3 In reaction to these concerns, the PSLRA implemented
a number of changes in securities laws, including rules on
discovery, lead plaintiffs, changes in proportionate liability, and
heightened pleading requirements."
Prior to the passage of the PSLRA, only about 20% of fraud
claims were dismissed. PoSt-PSLRA, the number of cases
38. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31-32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprintedin 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730-31. The PSLRA was controversial from its inception
and passed over the veto of then-President Bill Clinton. See also Pritchard,
supranote 7, at 2.
39. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31-32.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. STEPHANIE PLANCICH & SVETLANA STARYKH, NERA ECONOMIC
CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2009
MID-YEAR UPDATE 15 (2009), available at http://www.nera.com/extImage/
RecentTrendsReport_07_09.pdf.

320

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

resulting in dismissal has more than doubled to almost 44%.46
Because nearly 56% of cases settled, less than 1% of suits went to
trial.47 Although settlement is often a preferable alternative to
litigation for corporate defendants, reducing the number of
meritless cases that settle is important for financial markets
because the average settlement is nearly $29 million.4 8 Because the
vast majority of cases that survive dismissal result in settlement
rather than trial, stringent pleading requirements are the necessary
gatekeeper to prevent frivolous lawsuits. 4 9
Moreover, because the most ex ensive part of securities
litigation is the discovery process,5 the PSLRA altered the
pleading threshold to make it more difficult to pass muster under a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.51 To
that end, the PSLRA included a mandate that both plaintiff and
defendant stay discovery while a dismissal motion is pending. 52
This rule can dramatically decrease the expense of a frivolous
lawsuit because the claim may be dismissed before the expensive
process of discovery begins.5 3
2. The HeightenedPleadingRequirements
Prior to the passage of the PSLRA, pleadings were governed
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). 54 This rule set the
standard for the level of particularity necessary in averments of
fraud and required that the surrounding facts constituting fraud be
stated with particularity.5 5 In contrast, a general averment of
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. This figure does not include settlements over $1 billion. John E. Black,
Jr., D&O Litigation Trends in 2007-2008, IRMI.CoM, http://www.irmi.com/
(last visited
expert/articles/2009/black01-directors-officers-insurance.aspx#7
July 3, 2010). Note that these settlement figures necessarily include both those
that would have succeeded on the merits and those that simply settle regardless
of the merits, based on nuisance value.
49. Pritchard, supra note 7, at 13; see also Perino, supra note 2, at 919-21
(discussing incentive for corporations to settle regardless of merit of claim, due
to expense of discovery and harm to reputation).
50. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31-32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprintedin 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730-31.
5 1. Id.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2009).

53. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31-32.
54. Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1095 (10th Cir. 2003).

There is some debate about the particularity requirement pre-PSLRA among
various circuit courts. Post-PSLRA, this debate is largely irrelevant. See Perino,
supra note 2, at 926-27.
55. Id.
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malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind was

sufficient. 56
The PSLRA made changes in the pleading threshold of a
securities claim in several ways. The most restrictive changes for
plaintiffs are found in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) and (2). It is not
enough to make generalizations in the pleadings. These provisions
require that each allegedly false or misleading statement be pled
"with particularity, all facts on which that belief is formed."5 7
Furthermore, with respect to each act or omission, the plaintiff
must plead "with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind."5 8 The pleadings must indicate intent. The requirement that
scienter be pled with particularity stands in strong contrast to
former Rule 9(b), under which scienter needed to be alleged only
generally.59
It is this new set of requirements that led to the development of
the collective scienter pleading theory and caused a split among
federal circuit courts and a disagreement among scholars and
financial market players. For instance, securities market
organizations such as the Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association (SIFMA) take a firm stance, advocating a full-out
rejection of collective scienter.60 As part of SIFMA's strong
position against the use of collective scienter, it joined with the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable to
submit an amicus brief in a Seventh Circuit case in which plaintiffs
in a securities fraud class action lawsuit unsuccessfully attempted
recovery on a theory of collective scienter.61
On the other hand, some scholars believe that this legislation is
a bar to plaintiffs actually harmed by fraudulent activities. 6 2 Others
advocate a move to a pure agency theory, under which a
respondeat superior theory is utilized via the employment

5 6. Id.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2009).
58. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2).
59. Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1095 (10th Cir. 2003).
60. According to its website, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association (SIFMA) "brings together the shared interests of hundreds of
securities firms, banks and asset managers." Welcome to SIFMA.org,
SIFMA.oRG, http://www.sifna.org/about/about.html (last visited July 3, 2010).
61. Brief for Securities and Financial Markets Association et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants, Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div.
Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., 531 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 06-2902CV), 2007 WL 6376443 [hereinafter SIFMA Briefj.
62. Murdock, supra note 23.
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relationship. 6 3 Whatever the opinion of commentators, the federal
courts are largely riding the fence on the issue, with only the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits
adopting a bright-line rule and clearly rejecting the pleading theory
of collective scienter." Of the remaining circuits, one has
permitted the theory in pleading, 65 and still others have left the

door open. 6 6
II. POLICY, THEORY,

AND JURISPRUDENCE: CORPORATE ACTION
AND INTENT-COMPONENTS OF CORPORATE SCIENTER

Before a court will impute liability to a corporate entity for
securities fraud, both an action (the misstatement) and intent must
be present. 67 How these are alleged as corporate action, rather than
individual officer action, is important when analyzing the
usefulness and inherent fairness of a collective scienter pleading.
A. The Total is Greater than the Sum of its Parts-A Corporation
and its Agent
The composition of a corporation as a separate legal entity
owned by its shareholders and employing executive officers is an
important element in the analysis of corporate liability.68 This
creates the issue of whether a corporation is an individual entity or
a collection of persons. Obviously, in a sense it is both, but a
corporation as a separate entity cannot act alone. 6 9 Because a
corporation may not act independently, it acts through its agents.70
The elements of common-law agency often exist in the relationship
63. O'Riordan, supra note 16, at 1623. Respondeat superior is Latin for "let
the master answer."
64. See Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353
(5th Cir. 2004); see also Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 374 F.3d 1015 (11th
Cir. 2004).
65. See City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651
(6th Cir. 2004).
66. See, e.g., Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736 (9th Cir.
2008).
67. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005).
68. "A basic tenet of American corporate law is that the corporation and its
shareholders are distinct entities." Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468,
474 (2003).
69. See Bank of the U.S. v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 91 (1827).
Chief Justice Marshall's dissent offers a noteworthy summation of these legal
axioms, detailing the creation of a corporation, the distinction between the
corporate entity and its members, and its acts through members.
70. Id.
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between employer and employee-in the corporate context,
between the corporation and its officers. This principle is an
inherent key to determine corporate scienter.
The agency doctrine naturally brings into play potential
corporate liability for the acts of an agent. Agency, a common-law
principle, encompasses the theory of respondeat superior, which
makes an employer vicariously liable for torts committed by its
employees while acting within the scope of their employment.72
Respondeat superior is based on the status that is created by the
employment relationship.7 3
Consequently, when a corporate officer commits fraud, the
company may be liable for those acts.7 4 Notably, the liability of the
corporate employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior
cannot exceed that of the employee or servant.75 As a result, if the
employee is not individually culpable, neither is the employer.7 6
This doctrine creates an apparent tension with the theory of
collective scienter because collective scienter attempts to aggregate
the various elements of a claim-misstatements and intent-to
create the greater corporate liability when an individual agent is
not singularly responsible. In other words, it would make the
corporation liable for a claim greater than that of the employee's
individual culpability.
B. Scienter: What Constitutes Intent under SecuritiesLaw?
A securities fraud claim requires not only a misstatement or
omission, but also intent.7 7 To succeed, the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant acted with scienter. The mental state of
scienter is an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. 79 The
71. Id. at 70-71 (recapping the basic tenets of the corporate entity and
agency).
72. 27 AM. JuR. 2D Employment Relationship § 387 (2004).
73. Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 278 U.S. 349, 354 (1929).
74. Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280 (2003).
75. Employment Relationship, supra note 72; see also Robert Malionek &
Joseph Salama, "Collective Scienter": Nixed by the Second Circuit in Dynex?,
N.Y. L.J., Aug. 22, 2008, at 4 ("Can a corporation have a more culpable state of
mind than any one of its agents? Can a corporation commit fraud when no single
agent does?").
76. Employment Relationship,supra note 72.
77. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). Note that
recklessness has been found sufficient as well. See infra notes 89-90 and
accompanying text.
78. Id.
79. Id. Interestingly, although private securities claims are civil actions, the
scienter requirement analogizes the intent aspect more similarly to the criminal law
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United States Supreme Court set forth the standard to allege
scienter in Section 10(b) and lOb-5 claims in Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rikhts, Ltd.8 0 This standard requires a strong
inference of scienter.
First, for a pleading to indicate a "strong inference" of scienter,
the Supreme Court explained that the inquiry is "whether all of the
facts alle ed, taken collectively, give rise to a strong inference of
scienter." 2 The Court83then held that a trier of fact must consider
competing inferences. Put simply, plausible explanations must be
taken into account. Second, the Court explained that the inference
of scienter "must be more than merely plausible or reasonable-it
must be cogent and .. . compelling." 8
In addition, it is important to recognize how the federal courts
have shaped the standard for scienter and made several helpful
findings that delineate what may or may not constitute scienter for
purposes of a securities fraud claim. First, it is well settled that
negligence is insufficient for a finding of scienter.8 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit expounded on this,
stating, "[N]egligence whether gloss, grave or inexcusable cannot
serve as substitute for scienter."
A significant step beyond mere negligence is recklessness
which courts generally agree is sufficient for a showing of scienter.81
The Seventh Circuit, in the oft-cited case Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun
Chemical Corp., held that "a reckless omission of 89material facts"88
was actionable under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Moreover, the

version of mens rea, rather than the more common, and more easily proved, tort of
negligence. Id at 200-01 ("It is thus evident that Congress fashioned standards of
fault in the express civil remedies in the 1933 and 1934 Acts on a particularized
basis."); see also Abril & Olazabal, supra note 12, at 98-101 (discussing analogous
element of criminal law to intent element of securities fraud).
80. 551 U.S. 308, 322-23 (2007).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 323.
83. Id. at 323.
84. Id. at 314.
85. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 (1976).
86. McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1198 (3d Cir. 1979).
87. See Makor, 551 U.S. at 319 (noting that the Supreme Court had not
previously considered recklessness as sufficient for a finding of scienter, but
acknowledging that every Court of Appeals to consider the question has found
recklessness sufficient, although those courts differ on the degree of
recklessness required).
88. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044-45 (7th
Cir. 1977).
89. See generally William H. Kuehnle, On Scienter, Knowledge, and
Recklessness Under the Federal Securities Laws, 34 Hous. L. REv. 121 (1997)
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Second Circuit implicated willful blindness as sufficient for
scienter, holding that no defendant "can escape liability for fraud
by closing his eyes to what he saw and could readily understand.""o
Keeping these principles in mind helps one appreciate why a
narrow application of collective scienter is necessary.
Specific actions by corporate officers are another issue. In the
past, plaintiffs have repeatedly attempted to utilize signatures on
key documents (such as Sarbanes-Oxley 9 1 certifications) as proof
of scienter when information in the document is later deemed
false. 92 This argument was soundly rejected by the Fifth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits.9 3 The Eleventh Circuit explained,
"Sarbanes-Oxley certification is only probative of scienter if the
person signing the certification was .

.

statements." 94

. reckless in certifying the
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Accepted Accounting
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C. The Doctrine of Collective Scienter
One of the most challenging hurdles for a plaintiff who
attempts to adequately plead securities fraud is pleading facts, with
particularity, sufficient to raise an inference of scienter.9 7
Collective scienter uses a theory of collectivity to meet the

(thoroughly discussing what constitutes "scienter" under federal securities laws
and noting that recklessness is subject to varying interpretations by courts).
90. SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2009).
92. Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2008); Ind.
Elec. Workers' Pension Trust Fund IBEW v. Shaw Group, Inc., 537 F.3d 527 (5th
Cir. 2008); Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2006).
93. See supra note 92.
94. Garfield,466 F.3d at 1266-67.
95. In re Ceridian Corp. Sec. Litig., 542 F.3d 240 (8th Cir. 2008); PR
Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 364 F.3d 671 (6th Cir. 2004). But see In re Daou
Systems, Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1022 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that while GAAP
violations alone are insufficient, significant violations of GAAP can provide
evidence of scienter if they are pleaded with particularity).
96. San Leandro Emergency Med. Grp. Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris
Companies, Inc., 75 F.3d 801, 812 (1996).
97. Pritchard, supra note 7, at 7-8.
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pleading particularity requirements of the PSLRA. This theory
aggregates the misstatements or omissions by one corporate player
with the intent or knowledge of another that the statements were
fraudulent. The controversial theory has caused courts to reach.
varying results, with critics landing on both sides of the fence. 99
Proponents of collective scienter argue that without the availability
of this pleading theory, corporate officers with fraudulent
knowledge may be able to skirt liability by allowing others to
make the misstatements or omissions.10 Furthermore, many argue
that without the benefit of discovery, attributing misstatements and
omissions to specific individuals is too great a burden on
plaintiffs.'0 l

98. This notion of collectivity in pleading securities fraud is not isolated.
The theme of collectivity or aggregation appears in other doctrines as well,
including the group pleading doctrine and fact aggregation used when making
an allegation of a strong inference of scienter. The group pleading doctrine is a
jurisprudential theory that came out of the Ninth Circuit in Wool v. Tandem
Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1987). The theory allows authorship of
a group published document, such as an annual report or prospectus, to be
attributed to the collective actions of officers, thus assigning responsibility for
the statement to those officers. Although the group pleading doctrine has a
different aim (group pleading assigns responsibility for a corporate, grouppublished document to an individual; collective scienter works in reverse,
aggregating knowledge and misstatements by different actors and assigning
responsibility of various individuals to the corporation), the majority of courts
have held that the group pleading doctrine does not survive the PSLRA, for
similar reasons that collective scienter would not. Because the PSLRA requires
pleading with particularity, the courts rejecting group pleading find the theory
fails to allege that the particular misstatement was made by the particular
officer. However, a minority of courts have stated the doctrine is still alive and
well. The concept of collectivity is also used in pleading securities fraud to
create an inference of strong scienter as required by the PSLRA. This is the only
universally accepted notion of collectivity in this respect. The Supreme Court
has recognized that an inference of scienter may be created by aggregating facts
and looking at the picture as a whole to determine if an inference of strong
scienter exists. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 32223 (2007) (acknowledging this aggregation of facts by the federal circuit courts);
see supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text. Any further discussion of
collectivity and the group pleading doctrine is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
99. See infra Part III.
100. Murdock, supra note 23, at 43-46.
101. In his Veto Message regarding the PSLRA, President Clinton stated: "I
am not . . . willing to sign legislation that will have the effect of closing the
courthouse door on investors who have legitimate claims. . . . I believe that the
pleading requirements . . . impose an unacceptable procedural hurdle to
meritorious claims . . . ." 141 CONG. REC. 36, 207-08 (1995); see also Perino,

supra note 2, at 924-26.

2010]

COMMEfNT

327

This is a potential pitfall of an outright rejection of collective
scienter. If a corporate executive intentionally allows fraudulent
information to be made public, then wrong-doing occurs.
Likewise, if the executive is willfully blind, but is not the direct
speaker, fraud takes place. However, a plaintiff has little chance of
getting past the pleading stage to prove it.102
On the other hand, those courts that reject the theory require
that the individual with the requisite scienter must make the
misstatement.io3 Simply stated, to survive a dismissal claim under
the PSLRA in those courts, three elements must collide: (1) an
individual, (2) who makes a misstatement, (3) with fraudulent
intent. 0 4
Scholars and commentators who favor an outright rejection of
the theory fear that it casts too wide a net.' 05 They argue that the
theory would allow knowledge held by every employee, including
lower level employees, to be imputed to the corporation, even
though the executive officer has no knowledge or intent that any
statements he made may be fraudulent.' 0 6 Opponents of the theory
also argue that the use of collective scienter chills or slows
corporate communications. 0 7 Furthermore, those on this side of
the fence argue that Congress intended scienter to be a primary
requirement of a securities fraud claim; a collective scienter theory
allows a claim to become something more akin to neglient
liability or even strict liability, neither of which requires intent.
Finally, the courts that reject the use of collective scienter
reason that it simply does not work under the framework set up in
102. It should be noted that some scholars discussing the theory have
characterized the theory as operating in a "weak version" or "strong version."
See O'Riordan, supra note 16, at 1606-07; see also Jonathan W. Miller & Lyle
Roberts, Outside Counsel: "Collective Scienter" in Securities Fraud Cases,
N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 2008, at 4 (referring to collective scienter as "broad" or
"narrow"). Others have distinguished versions of the theory in terms of
"collective knowledge" versus "collective action." See Malionek & Salama,
supra note 75; see also Abril & Olazabal, supra note 12, at 86 (referring to
collective knowledge). For purposes of this Comment, the pleading theory as a
whole will be considered.
103. Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 374 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 (11th Cir.
2004).
104. Id.
105. SIFMA Brief, supra note 61.
106. Id.
107. Miller & Roberts, supra note 102.
108. Id.; see also Edward J. Fuhr, Terence J. Rasmussen & Steven M. Haas,
Second Circuit Addresses Collective Scienter: Court Raises the Bar for
Plaintiffs in Securities Suits Filed in the Wake of a Market Collapse, CORP.
CouNs., Oct. 2008, at 1. The Supreme Court has clearly rejected negligence as
insufficient. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 (1976).
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the PSLRA. These courts, notably the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits,
read the language regarding pleading requirements very strictly,
finding that scienter must be alleged with respect to each defendant
and each alleged misstatement. 109 This strict statutory
interpretation, however, is overly limiting in some situations. This
split in the circuit courts raises questions and uncertainty among
plaintiffs and defendants as appellate courts interpret the PSLRA
requirements differently.

III. LANDING ON DIFFERENT SIDES OF THE FENCE ON COLLECTIVE
SCIENTER-AN EXAMINATION OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS'
SPLIT
A split has developed among the federal circuit courts over the
use of collective scienter in order to meet the heightened pleading
requirements of the PSLRA. Two circuits have rejected a
collective theory of scienter.110 Others have yet to sanction a
plaintiffs use of the theory, but have left the door open for
possible use in the right circumstances." Only the Sixth Circuit,
although not explicitly using the term "collective scienter," has
permitted this type of theory in order to allow plaintiffs to
adequately plead scienter.112
A. Two Circuits' Outright Rejection of Collective Scienter
Within a span of a few months in 2004, the issue of collective
scienter appeared in courtrooms in the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh
Circuits with widely divergent results. The Fifth Circuit led the
charge against collectivity and addressed the issue in Southland
Securities Corp. v. Inspire Insurance Solutions, Inc.H3 In
Southland, the defendant provided software and other services. 114
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant engaged in securities fraud
through several actions, including pushing software with major
109. Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 374 F.3d 1015 (11th Cir. 2004);
Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353 (5th Cir.
2004).
110. See supranote 109.
111. See Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2008);
Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., 531 F.3d
190 (2d Cir. 2008); Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702
(7th Cir. 2008).
112. City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651 (6th
Cir. 2005).
113. 365 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2004).
114. Id. at 359.
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design flaws and issuing inaccurate revenue and earnings
statements in press releases and other corporate documents."' 5 The
court first flatly rejected any use of the group pleading doctrine,
explaining that it did not survive the PSLRA. 6 Next, the court
reasoned, to determine if a corporate statement was made with the
requisite scienter, the court must "look to the state of mind of the
individual corporate official or officials who make or issue the
statement (or order or approve it . . . ) rather than generally to the

collective knowledge of all the corporation's officers and
employees."" 7 By disallowing an aggregation of one individual's
knowledge with the misstatement of another employee or officer,
the court rejected the pleading theory of collective scienter.
The Eleventh Circuit was the next court given the opportunity
to address the issue." 8 The question asked was whether
"allegations that standing alone do not give rise to a 'strong
inference' of scienter under the PSLRA may nevertheless be
aggregated to create such a finding."119 Drawing from the
reasoning of the Fifth Circuit, the court held, "[s]cienter must be
found with respect to each defendant and with respect to each
alleged violation of the statute." 120 Again, a collective set of
misstatements and intent failed to suffice when both elements did
not reside in the same actor. For both the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits, the plain statutor language of the PSLRA does not allow
for this pleading theory.' 2 The PSLRA pleading standard refers to
"the defendant," a phrase which led these courts to conclude that
the PSLRA may only be interpreted in a manner that requires a
single actor and thus cannot support collective scienter. 122
B. The Sixth CircuitTakes a DiferentApproach
Although the court did not expressly use the term, the Sixth
Circuit addressed the collective scienter issue in City of Monroe

115. Id. at 360.
116. Id. at 364-65. The court refused to allow responsibility for a grouppublished document to be imputed to an individual corporate officer merely on
the basis of his or her title. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
117. SouthlandSec., 365 F.3d at 366.
118. Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 374 F.3d 1015 (11th Cir. 2004). The
appellate court addressed the issue in a certified question from the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
119. Id. at 1016.
120. Id. at 1017-18.
121. Id. at 1018.
122. Id.
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Employees Retirement System v. Bridgestone Corp.123 Bridgestone,
a Japanese company, and Firestone, its United States-based
subsidiary, began to have tire quality issues. 124 Firestone was
accused of manufacturing faulty tires that caused numerous
accidents.12 5 In addition to naming both corporations as defendants,
the plaintiffs also named Masatoshi Ono, who was both Executive
Vice-President of Bridgestone and CEO of Firestone.' 26 The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants made a number of material
public misrepresentations concerning the safety and performance
of the company's products.' 2 7 Later, after severe safety issues
came to light resulting in massive recalls and a number of lawsuits,
the price of Bridgestone stock took a major dive.128 The facts in
this case proved to be of utmost importance to demonstrate a need
for the pleading theory of collective scienter in certain situations.
A number of significant events surrounded the Bridgestone
decision. According to the court's narrative Firestone management
was clearly aware of a number of issues.l 9 Firestone's problems
began with poor tire quality problems, primarily those tires
produced at the Decatur, Illinois plant.'3 0 Furthermore, Firestone's
own internal and external quality control tests repeatedly indicated
high failure rates.131
As a result, a number of major incidents occurred. These
included a demand from State Farm Insurance to pay the costs
123. 399 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2005). This case was originally heard in 2004.
City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 387 F.3d 468 (6th Cir.
2004), modified, 399 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2005). The court later amended its
ruling, but there were no significant changes regarding collective scienter.
124. Bridgestone, 399 F.3d at 656. Although Firestone was a foreign-owned
corporation and did not trade on any United States stock exchange, shares were
traded in the form of American Depositary Receipts ("ADRs") in the over-thecounter market. Id. at 655-56. Each ADR represented ten shares of Bridgestone
common stock. These ADRs had been purchased by the Monroe Retirement
Fund. Id.
125. Id. at 656.
126. Id. at 655. Kaizaki, the CEO of Bridgestone, was also named but was
dismissed as a defendant for lack of personal jurisdiction.
127. Id at 659.
128. Id. at 663.
129. Id. at 656-63.
130. Id. at 657. Firestone, in response to pressure to cut costs and increase
production, ramped up manufacturing at an Illinois-based factory, which
resulted in a labor strike. Firestone's response by staffing the production lines
with untrained workers, in combination with using a pellet-rubber material later
shown to be substandard, resulted in a very large number of poor-quality tires
being produced. The tread on these tires began to separate, resulting in tire
failure and a large number of vehicle accidents and rollovers. Id.
131. Id.
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attributable to accidents of its clients resulting from faulty tires.132
Firestone reimbursed State Farm without public disclosure.' 3 3
Next, several governmental investigations began.' 34 The State of
Arizona notified Firestone of tire issues;' Firestone responded b
replacing the tires on the state's fleet without public disclosure.
The Venezuelan government, responding to an inordinate number
of deaths resulting from tire failure accidents, demanded a tire
redesign.13 7 Firestone complied in exchange for a promise of no
public disclosure.'3 Following soon after, the Saudi Arabian
government, responding to a refusal to issue a recall, banned
Firestone tire importation.1 39 Furthermore, several thousand
individual complaints and a number of lawsuits were filed in a
short time period.14 0 In short, the company was under fire. Despite
these events, Firestone and Bridgestone continued to stonewall and
publicly stated that "objective data" indicated that the tires were

safe.141
The plaintiffs' hurdle in this case resulted from the PSLRA
particularity pleading requirements. Ono, the CEO of Firestone,
was not the speaker of the fraudulent statements that were made in
the corporation's annual reports and in press releases.142 When
analyzing the facts, the court first pointed to several specific
statements that it held fraudulent. 14 3 The next element, of course,
was to link the intent to defraud with the speaker.'" Because none
of the statements could be directly attributed to CEO Ono, a theory

132. Id at 658.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id
137. Id.
138. Id The Venezuelan government made this demand after Firestone
refused a demand by Ford (which was the primary customer of the troubling
tires on its Explorer). When Firestone refused to respond to Ford, the
Venezuelan government stepped in. Id.
139. Id. at 662. An internal memo at Firestone indicated that the refusal to
institute a recall in the Persian Gulf was based in large part on the fear that the
U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration would have to be notified
because the same product was sold in the United States. Id. at 659.
140. Id. at 657.
141. Id. at 661. The "objective data" statement was a key statement held by
the court to be misleading information.
142. Id. at 661-63, 690.
143. Id. at 670.
144. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the elements of a securities fraud claim).

332

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

of collective scienter was the only way that the plaintiffs could
meet the pleading requirements under the PSLRA.
In a well-reasoned anal sis, the court explained why Firestone
could be found liable.14 The court used a totality-of-thecircumstances test to determine that there existed a strong
inference of scienter with respect to Bridgestone and Firestone, in
part by imputing Ono's knowledge to Firestone.14 7 The court
allowed the plaintiffs to aggregate two key elements: the
misleading statements made in the corporate-issued statements and
the knowledge (scienter) of Ono (attributable to Firestone via an
agency theory). 48 In so doing, the plaintiffs made a sufficient
pleading to survive a motion to dismiss.14 9
C. The Fence Riders
The collective scienter issue came before the Second, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuit courts in 2008. Each of these circuits failed to
find the theory viable on the facts before them, yet indicated that
they were open to the possibility under different facts.'s 0 In light of
this uncertainty, the disparity between the Sixth Circuit and the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits continues to underscore the reality that
the same situation may indeed be different in different courtrooms.
1. The Ninth Circuit's Stance Evolves
The Ninth Circuit took a seemingly ambiguous position. First
the court decided Nordstrom, Inc. v. Chubb & Son, Inc. in 1995."s
Chubb, the plaintiff, was the parent company of Federal, the Error
145. Bridgestone, 399 F.3d at 689-90. The court rejected use of the group
pleading doctrine, which meant none of the fraudulent statements could be
attributed directly to Ono; whether he had the requisite scienter therefore
became irrelevant for him as an individual defendant. The court explained that
although respondeatsuperior allowed his actions and intent to be attributable to
the company, liability does not flow the other way, from corporation to
individual. Id. at 690 n.34.
146. Id. at 690.
147. Id. at 690 n.34.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 690-91. After a remand and a variety of other procedural issues in
the district court, Bridgestone and Firestone eventually settled for approximately
$30 million in 2008.
150. Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2008);
Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., 531 F.3d
190 (2d Cir. 2008); Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702
(7th Cir. 2008).
151. 54 F.3d 1424 (9th Cir. 1995).
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and Omissions policy insurer of Nordstrom's officers and
directors.152 Nordstrom was accused of securities fraud in a class
action suit that ultimately settled.153 Chubb, via Federal, was
responsible for the indemnification of the six officers and directors
who committed the fraud.154 Federal filed its claim because the
insurance policy covered liability of individual officers and
directors, but not liability of the corporation itself.15 5 Federal
argued that fault under the settlement should be allocated between
individual liability (of the officers) and corporate liability. 5 6
Under such an allocation, Federal would have been responsible
only for the amount directly attributable to the individuals, while
the cororation's liability would have been covered by Nordstrom
itself.
The court began the analysis by explaining that allocation
could only be made "if there is some amount of corporate liability
that is both independent of and not duplicated by liability against
the directors and officers." 5 8 Federal argued that the corporation
could be solely liable for "certain acts and omissions of the
directors and officers, because it is possible that only the
corporation, under a theory of 'collective scienter,' would have had
the intent required to establish liability." 59 The court explained,
first, that at that time there was no case law that would support an
independent theory of collective scienter.160 Second, there was "no
evidence in this case to support 'collective scienter' without a
concurrent finding that a defendant director or officer also had the
requisite intent." 1 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit refused to find
collective scienter.162 This decision set the stage for subsequent
misinterpretations within the circuit.
In 2002, the Northern District Court of California addressed the
issue of collective scienter as well.163 The district court cited the
Nordstrom holding, concluding that "[t]he Ninth Circuit has
152. Id. at 1427.
153. Id. at 1428.
154. Id. at 1428-29.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1430.
157. Id.
158. Id at 1433.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1435. This case was decided in 1995, before any court had
allowed or condoned the use of a collective scienter theory.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1435-36.
163. The Northern District Court of California is located in the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals and is bound by its holdings.
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rejected the concept of collective scienter."164 Clearly, the district
court interpreted Nordstrom as an across-the-board rejection.
However, six years later, Glazer Capital Management, LP v.
Magistri was appealed, and the Ninth Circuit once again took up
the issue.' 66 The court attempted to clarify its position, this time
taking a more moderate stance regarding collective scienter.
In Glazer, shareholders filed a securities fraud claim against
InVision Technologies.167 InVision had announced a merger
agreement with General Electric.168 A few months later, InVision,
via press release, announced that internal investigations had
uncovered possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
which put the merger in jeopardy.' 6 9 Immediately after the press
release was issued, stock prices fell, which resulted in the filing of
the claim against InVision and its CEO, Sergio Magistri.170 The
claims centered on statements made in the merger a eement
assuring compliance with all laws, which Magistri signed.
Plaintiffs alleged that because the merger agreement contained
statements assuring compliance with all laws, the company
knowingly made fraudulent statements.172 Although the court
found three statements were false, the scienter element was in
question.173 The court clarified the district court's decision in
Apple, stating, it "appears to have overstated our holding in
Nordstrom. We had at that time not categorically rejected the
concept of 'collective scienter."' 174 The Ninth Circuit explained
that in Nordstrom, it merely was not present "on the facts of the
case." 1 75
Even so, the Ninth Circuit once again refused to accept a
pleading of collective scienter.176 The court held that Glazer must
164. In re Apple Computer, Inc. Sec. Litig., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1023
(N.D. Cal. 2002).
165. See McCasland v. Formfactor Inc., No. 07-5545, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
60544, at *23 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2008) (similarly rejecting collective scienter a
scant few months before Glazer was handed down, thus modifying the Ninth
Circuit's stance on the theory).
166. 549 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2008).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 739.
169. Id. The merger was ultimately consummated, in spite of the violations.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 739. The validity of the violations was not in doubt, particularly in
light of InVision's agreement to pay a fine to the Department of Justice and a
settlement with the SEC. Id. at 740.
173. Id. at 742-44.
174. Id. at 744.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 745.

COMMENT

2010]

335

plead individual scienter with respect to Magistri because Magistri
made the statements. Simply because a different employee knew of
the violations while not knowing of the misstatement was
insufficient.177 Factually important in this case, the employees who
were aware of the violations were located overseas, in Asian sales,
which made it next to impossible for Magistri to have been aware
of the violations at the time of the statements. 178 Although once
again rejecting the use of collective scienter, the court continued to
leave the door slightly ajar by stating in dicta, "[T]here could be
circumstances in which a company's public statements were so
important and so dramatically false that they would create a strong
inference that at least some corporate officials knew of the falsity

upon publication.,l

79

2. The Seventh Circuit's Take
The Seventh Circuit first addressed such an issue in
Caterpillar,Inc. v. Great American Insurance Co. 80 Decided in
1995, the problem was not a pleading sufficiency issue under
PSLRA, but an insurance allocation issue much like that in
Nordstrom, which was decided the same year in the Ninth
Circuit.1si The Seventh Circuit followed a similar analysis,
ultimately rejecting the plaintiffs' call for a finding of collective
scienter, but once again leaving on the table the possibility for the
theory's usage under certain circumstances.' 82
The Seventh Circuit had another chance to consider scienter
under the PSLRA when the court faced Makor for a second time
177. Id.
178. Id. at 745-47. A signature assuring compliance with all laws in all states
is impossible to guarantee; to do so would impute a strong liability for even
minute infractions. These signatures tend to operate more as a warranty than a
guarantee, in that if a problem occurs, the company will make itself whole by
paying damages.
179. Id. at 744.
180. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 62 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1995).
181. In a completely un-analytical observation, the author notes that courts
tend to be less sympathetic toward insurance companies who attempt to use a
controversial theory and invoke a liberalization of the rules to defray indemnity
expenses, compared to shareholders who may have been defrauded, as in the
Sixth Circuit decision in Bridgestone. Neither insurance allocation case
(Nordstrom or Caterpillar) raised PSLRA issues, but simply argued for
collective scienter in order to avoid indenmifying a settlement; both were
decided in 1995, the same year PSLRA was passed, so arguably were in the best
position to get the go-ahead with such a theory, judicial lack of sympathy
notwithstanding.
182. Caterpillar,62 F.3d at 962-63.
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after a remand by the Supreme Court in 2008.
In Makor, the
Seventh Circuit discussed corporate liability under Rule 1Ob-5.1 84
The court stated,
To establish corporate liability . . . requires [the court]

"look[ing] to the state of mind of the individual[s] ... who
make or issue the statement . .. rather than generally to the

collective knowledge of all the corporation's officers and
employees acquired in the course of their employment."' 8 5
The court went on to give an example, hypothesizing that a
low-level employee guilty of embezzlement could deliberately
conceal the information.
He could then feed false
communications to his superiors, which would result in misleading
public statements.' 8 7 This would not create liability that could be
imputed to his employer unless the acts were on behalf of the
corporation. 8 8
In the wake of this hypothesis, however, the court made
another observation:
But it is possible to draw a strong inference of corporate
scienter without being able to name the individuals who
concocted and disseminated the fraud. Suppose General
Motors announced that it had sold one million SUVs in
2006, and the actual number was zero. There would be a
strong inference of corporate scienter, since so dramatic an
announcement would have been approved by corporate
officials sufficiently knowledgeable about the company to
know that the announcement was false. 189
Therefore, once again, a federal circuit court left open the door
for the possible use of collective scienter in pleading securities
fraud.

183. 513 F.3d 702, 708-09 (7th Cir. 2008).
184. Id. at 708.
185. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Southland Sec. Corp. v.
INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004)).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 710. This type of inference borders on a res ipsa loquitur theory,
in which although it could not be alleged with particularity which corporate
officer had knowledge of the issue, clearly someone in this position had to
know. In other words, the facts simply speak for themselves. See infra notes
210-15 and accompanying text.
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3. The Second CircuitJoins the Fray
Also in 2008, the closely watched Second Circuit took up the
issue when it decided Teamsters Local 445 Freight Division
PensionFund v. Dynex CapitalInc. 19 The Teamsters pension fund
alleged that Dynex misrepresented the reason for the financial
losses and concealed defective underwriting practices.191
Teamsters' complaint alleged scienter on the part of the
corporation yet failed to plead scienter against any individual
defendant.19 2 The court explained that under the PSLRA "the
pleaded facts must create a strong inference that someone whose
intent could be imputed to the corporation acted with the requisite
scienter."l 93 The court noted that the simplest route would be to
plead intent for an individual defendant. 94 Here, however, the
court found that the plaintiffs failed to allege scienter sufficiently
and remanded the case allowing plaintiffs to amend the
pleading. 9 5
Moreover, like the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, the Second
Circuit refused to reject the notion of collective scienter as a matter
of law, once again leaving the door open with this statement:
"Congress has imposed strict requirements on securities fraud
pleading, but we do not believe they have imposed the rule urged
by defendants, that in no case can corporate scienter be pleaded in
the absence of successfully pleading scienter as to an expressly
named officer." 96 The court quoted the Seventh Circuit's
observation of a possibility of its use in the remand of Makor,
which also left the door open to such a case.' 9 7

IV. SPANNING

THE USAGE SPECTRUM

The federal circuit courts seem to have taken positions along a
spectrum of approval. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits rejected the
190. 531 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2008).
191. Id. at 193. Shareholders in a class action suit alleged Dynex Capital
made risky loans to unworthy borrowers yet failed to disclose these practices; as
a result, when the financial markets began to slide, a large number of loans
failed. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 195.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 196.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 195-96; see supra note 189 and accompanying text. The court
quoted the General Motors SUV hypothetical from the Seventh Circuit's opinion
in Makor.

338

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

pleading theory of collective scienter across the board.' 98 Only the
Sixth Circuit has accepted it,1 99 while other circuit courts insinuate
that they would consider the theory, but only in certain
circumstances. The careful refusal to slam the door on collective
scienter by the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits indicates that a
situation in which a strong inference of corporate scienter exists is
possible. 20 0 This occurrence would be based on a special situation
in which there is no possible way corporate officials, who may not
have been the actual speakers of false information, could not have
known of the falsity. This situation is exactly what occurred in the
Sixth Circuit in Bridgestone.
Bridgestone was decided in 2005,201 three years before Glazer,
Teamsters, or Makor in the three fence-riding circuits. Notably, all
three courts-the Ninth, Seventh, and Second Circuits-did not
acknowledge Bridgestone's holding in their respective opinions.
This obvious omission seems to indicate a reluctance to take a firm
stance and openly reject or condone the theory in these circuits in
the absence of an appropriate set of facts. However, all three
circuits clearly had a situation such as Bridgestone in mind when
ruling in 2008 and, although failing to find collective scienter on
the instant facts of each case, were careful to leave sufficient legal
wiggle room for the use of the theory in the right situation. The
following section examines the facts of Bridgestone under the
analyses used by other circuits when considering collective
scienter in pleadings. This analysis demonstrates why the theory
should not be rejected out of hand due to the danger of an
overbroad dismissal policy.
A. The Fifth Circuit'sAnalysis
The Fifth Circuit set the standard for a hard-line rejection of
collective scienter, and this standard was closely adopted by the
Eleventh Circuit as well.20 2 Under the Fifth Circuit's analysis, even
the fact pattern in Bridgestonewould have resulted in a rejection of
collective scienter. For the Fifth Circuit to accept a pleading
alleging corporate scienter, Ono, the only corporate officer named
as a defendant, would have had to directly make the fraudulent
198. See supra Part III.A.
199. See supra Part III.B.
200. See supra Part III.C.
201. Bridgestone first came before the Sixth Circuit in 2004 and was later
reconsidered and amended in 2005. City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v.
Bridgestone Corp., 387 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2004), modified, 399 F.3d 651 (6th
Cir. 2005).
202. See supra Part III.A.
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statement, or the pleading would have had to allege that Ono
knowingly ordered the statement or furnished the information,
rather than utilize any collective knowledge, to infer scienter.203
Although information that would suffice may have been
uncovered during discovery, this strict approach on the facts of
Bridgestone would block potentially valid plaintiffs' claims from
progressing past the pleading stage. This stance is overly limiting
for plaintiffs, creating a hard-line position that prevents plaintiffs
with legitimate claims from surviving a dismissal motion.
B. The Circuits Still on the Fence
The Ninth Circuit, in Glazer, was quick to correct the Northern
District of California's misinterpretation of Nordstrom, noting the
circuit had not "categorically rejected the concept of 'collective
scienter."' 204 The Ninth Circuit rejected the pleadings in Glazer,
but under the court's analysis, the fact pattern presented in
Bridgestone would have passed muster and survived a motion to
dismiss. The court quoted the hypothetical posed by the Seventh
Circuit in Makor, stating that "there could be circumstances in
which a company's public statements were so important and so
dramatically false that they would create a strong inference that at
least some corporate officials knew of the falsity upon

publication." 2 05
This was the case in Bridgestone-the plaintiffs alleged that
Ono participated in meetings in which the multitude of
incriminatin facts, lawsuits, and quality test failures were
discussed.2 0 According to the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiff would
need to allege the corporate officer was "personally aware . . . or
actively involved."207 Although the Glazer court was clear that a
"should have known" allegation was insufficient,2 0 8 the
Bridgestone plaintiffs alleged that Ono did know of the fraudulent
statements. 20 Therefore, under the analysis used by the Ninth
Circuit, the Bridgestone facts would have reached the same result
as the Sixth Circuit and allowed collective scienter as a pleading
203. Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366
(5th Cir. 2004).
204. Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 744 (9th Cir.
2008).
205. Id. at 744.
206. City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651,
659 (6th Cir. 2005).
207. Glazer, 549 F.3d at 745.
208. Id. at 748.
209. Bridgestone, 399 F.3d at 659.
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theory. The Second and Seventh Circuits used similar analyses and
would likely reach the same conclusion under the holdings in
Teamsters and Makor.
By overlaying the circumstances presented in the Bridgestone
case with the varying federal circuit analyses, the distance between
the positions of the courts becomes clear. Further complicating the
picture and demonstrating a need for a clear ruling is the apparent
leaning of some influential courts toward a res ipsa loquitur type
of argument. In Makor, the Seventh Circuit utilized an oft-cited
hypothetical regarding General Motors and SUVs. 2 10 In this
argument, the court insinuated that the facts could speak for
themselves and that in such a situation, even if an individual could
not be identified, surely someone had to know of the
misstatements. 21 1 To date, only one such court has directly
addressed a PSLRA claim premised on this type of ground. In In re
ParametricTechnology Corp. Securities Litigation, 2 the plaintiffs
did not rely on specific factual allegations; rather, the pleadings
attempted what the court termed a "res ipsa loquitur rationale,"
noting that the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants "must have
known." 213 The court admitted that in the past, these allegations
would likely have been adequate.214 However, the court held these
arguments insufficient to comply with the PSLRA's more

strenuous demands. 2 15
The complication of the issue is demonstrated through such a
disparity in courts' reasonings, outcomes, and "what ifs." These
inconsistencies magnify the need for clarity within the federal
court system, even as federal district courts continue to struggle
with the possibility of collective scienter as a sufficient pleading
21
theory.216 The solution must be both equitable and reasonable and
must, most importantly, remain within the parameters set by the
PSLRA.

210. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 708-09 (7th
Cir. 2008); see supra note 189.
211. Id.
212. 300 F. Supp. 2d 206 (D. Mass. 2001).
213. Id. at 223.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See In re Cadence Design Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 654 F. Supp. 2d 1037
(N.D. Cal. 2009); In re Faro Tech. Sec. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (M.D. Fla.
2007); Roth v. OfficeMax, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ill. 2007). All of
these cases debate the viability of a collective scienter theory of pleading under
the PSLRA.
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V. BRIDGING THE DIVIDE: THE SOLUTION-A NARROW USAGE
WITH

OBvious KNOWLEDGE

Some scholars reject collective scienter in favor of a pure
respondeat superior requirement. 2 17 Such an argument fails,
however, because it would not suffice in the same type of narrow
circumstances demonstrated by the examination of the Fifth
Circuit's holdings. Although respondeat superior is an integral
part of the analysis, the doctrine alone is insufficient to prevent
loopholes created by corporate executives who deliberately avoid
making false statements while allowing others to do so. Other
scholars recommend a complicated set of rules that would consider
the corporate agents, not by their status within the corporation, but
by their level of involvement in the issue. 218 This set of rules
would also examine corporate personality, including corporate
culture and common knowledge, and scrutinize them in a context
similar to criminal culpability.
Absent a ruling by the Supreme Court or a statutory
clarification by Congress, the most reasonable and equitable rule
for federal courts to adopt in considering securities fraud pleadings
is one similar to that adopted by the Sixth Circuit. This rule allows
collective scienter as a pleading theory in securities fraud claims
only in very narrow circumstances. This means that a narrow usage
of the theory would be acceptable only in those rare cases when a
corporate executive is not the speaker of the misinformation but
has clear knowledge that the information is false or misleading, in
tandem with an awareness that the statements were made.
When Congress passed the PSLRA in 1995, the accompanying
report outlined the purpose of the Act, which included protecting
investors and issuers from abusive securities litigation and put in
place procedural protections to discourage such suits.22 The House
Report that accompanied the passage of the PSLRA noted that
"[t]he PSLRA protects outside directors, and others who may be
sued for non-knowing securities law violations, from liability for
damage actually caused by others." 221 The "non-knowing"
language indicates that a broad usage of the collective scienter
theory would not and should not alone suffice. Likewise, a res ipsa
loquitur type of theory is insufficient because the particularity
217. O'Riordon, supra note 16.
218. Abril & Olazabal, supra note 12.
219. Id. at 153-59.
220. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31-32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprintedin 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730-31.
221. Idat4l.
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requirement is simply written out of the equation. However, a
narrow usage of collective scienter upon an allegation of patent
awareness of the misinformation by a corporate officer bridges the
gap between overly strict requirements and a liberal pleading
theory.
Simply by its nature, the collective scienter doctrine has the
potential to be abused if broadly implemented, as demonstrated in
the Glazer case. 222 Furthermore, an overly broad use would
abrogate the purpose of the PSLRA. Therefore, its use necessarily
should be limited to very narrow circumstances where the
plaintiffs can show a big picture charging clear fraud on behalf of a
corporation with knowing action or inaction by executive officers,
even though the distinct connection between an individual actor
and the misstatement may not be immediately evident.
This rule necessitates a fact-intensive analysis, taking into
account the knowledge of misinformation by a corporate officer,
and considers his position, responsibilities, and actions. A lower
level employee's knowledge, without more, is not enough.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court indicated, a negligence or "should
have known" standard is patently insufficient. 2 Under this rule, a
valid complaint must charge that the corporate officers were aware
of the misinformation and the inconsistent corporate statement,
even though they themselves did not make the statement, andfailed
to act. Anything less would violate the particularity requirements
of the PSLRA.
Furthermore, a narrow usage clearly creates a more equitable
result. Consider Scenario #1 referred to earlier, in which a CEO
makes a non-knowing misstatement.224 To aggregate his statement
with the knowledge of low-level scientists operating in a foreign
country is not only unfair, but it is clearly not what Congress
intended under the PSLRA.
Consider Scenario #2.225 A CEO makes a non-knowing
statement, while another high-ranking executive, the CFO, has
knowledge of its falsity. This type of scenario would require
sufficient allegations to indicate intent on behalf of the corporation
by charging knowledge of the CFO. This is arguably the type of
scenario in which a collective scienter pleading allowance is the
most useful. Whether the executive with the scienter was acting in
222. Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2008). If
the court had allowed the theory of collective scienter to be utilized based only
on the strength of a CEO signature, these signatures would have become similar
to a strict liability.
223. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 (1976).
224. See the introductory hypotheticals to this Comment, supra.
225. See the introductory hypotheticals to this Comment, supra.
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a manner that could be imputed to the corporation through a
respondeatsuperior theory is a situation that perhaps may only be
determinable upon discovery, yet a use of collective scienter in the
pleadings is the only way a valid claim by the plaintiffs will
survive a dismissal.
Finally, consider Scenario #3.226 The CEO intentionally avoids
making the statements himself. He knows the information being
disseminated is untrue, yet deliberately refuses to act. A collective
scienter pleading would avoid the overly strict, loophole situation
created by a Fifth Circuit type of analysis, producing a far more
equitable result by allowing such a pleading to survive a dismissal.
Examining the theory in such scenarios demonstrates how a
limited availability of the theory for use only in very narrow
circumstances would meet the demanding pleading standards
under the PSLRA yet still prevent the fear that opponents have of
trapping unknowing corporate officers who make statements in
good faith that later turn out to be false. This limited usage also
prevents the chilling effect on corporate disclosure that results
from a pervasive fear of inadvertent misstatements.
CONCLUSION

A narrow usage of the theory of collective scienter in pleading
securities fraud will accomplish what Congress originally
intended: to stem the tide of frivolous lawsuits on "fishing
expeditions," 22 7 hoping to uncover ammunition during discovery
yet not advocating such a stringent usage as to block plaintiffs who
can show that corporate awareness was clearly evident from the
totality of the circumstances. The fear of being held liable for nonknowing violations is not implicated by a narrow rule that allows a
collective scienter pleading when plaintiffs can allege that the
corporate officers possessed obvious knowledge. A narrow usage,
occurring strictly in the face of obvious knowledge of corporate
officers, would also allay the fears that collective scienter converts
Rule 1Ob-5 into a mere negligence or strict liability statute. 228 By
advocating such a rule, equity and fairness are satisfied, while
remaining within the parameters and purpose Congress intended by
226. See the introductory hypotheticals to this Comment, supra.
227. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 37 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 736. The House Report specifically refers to "fishing
expedition[s]" in the context of plaintiffs with frivolous claims who are
searching for any "shred of evidence." Id.
228. Fuhr, Rasmussen & Haas, supra note 108. As noted previously,
negligence is insufficient for a holding of scienter. See supra note 86 and
accompanying text.
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passage of the PSLRA. Furthermore, the uncertainty that is created
by circuit courts riding the fence is removed, and forum shopping
fails to result in a bargain for plaintiffs. In other words, two things
that are exactly the same, are in fact, exactly the same.
HeatherF. Crow*
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